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The Availability of Preliminary Injunctive Relief to
Private Plaintiffs Pending Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission Action Under Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964
JUDITH ASHTON*
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964' was enacted for the
purpose of securing equal employment opportunity to employees by
eliminating employment practices that discriminate on the basis of
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.2 To achieve this goal,
Congress established the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and directed it to receive, investigate, and attempt to
conciliate charges of discrimination made by individuals and
groups.' Primary responsibility for court enforcement, 4 however, was
given to private individuals who, if the EEOC can not conciliate
their claims, can file civil actions against errant employers in the
federal district courts. 5 In 1972, Title VII was amended to allow the
EEOC to seek court enforcement.'
Given this statutory scheme that encourages informal persuasion
as the initial method of securing full equal employment opportunities, the necessity of preserving the status quo while this statutory
method is pursued becomes clear both from the point of view of an
individual complainant and from that of the public. From the
perspective of the individual complainant in a Title VII case, unless
immediate preliminary relief is available pending EEOC's disposition of a case, final relief may well be of little value. For the employee who is fired, two or more years of unemployment while awaiting EEOC action may fully drain financial and personal resources.
The damage to the employee's reputation may well be irreparable.
* Associate with the firm of Haussermann, Davison & Shattuck in Boston, Massachusetts
and Instructor in Law, Boston University School of Law. B.A., Northwestern University,
1970; J.D., cur laude, Boston University School of Law, 1973.
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e-15 (1970), as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e-17 (Supp. II,
1972) [hereinafter referred to as Title VIII.
2. H.R. REP. No. 92-238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1971).
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-4, 2000e-5(a), (b) (Supp. II, 1972).
4. Under the 1964 Act, the Attorney General was empowered to file actions on behalf of
the United States when there was reason to believe that "a pattern or practice of resistance"
to the rights secured by Title VII existed. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(a) (1970), as amended, (Supp.
II, 1972). In March of 1974, this power was transferred to the EEOC. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(c)
(Supp. II, 1972).
5. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (Supp. II, 1972).
6. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (Supp. II, 1972), amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1970). [hereinafter
referred to as 1972 Amendmentsl. For an excellent overview of the 1972 Amendments, see
Sape & Hart, Title VII Reconsidered: The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 40
GEo. WASH. L. REV. 824 (1972).
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For the employee who is demoted, future opportunities may be irreversibly limited by events or simply by the passage of time. Moreover, from a public policy standpoint, to allow discrimination to
continue pending long administrative procedures, especially in the
form of firing an employee because of his or her race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin, or because he or she has complained of
discrimination, legitimizes and fosters such unlawful and invidious
practices.7
Regardless of its necessity, whether preliminary judicial relief is
available to private plaintiffs to preserve the status quo pending
EEOC action has not yet been firmly established. This article will
examine the language of Title VII and the legislative history of that
statute; it will analyze the rationale used in past cases in deciding
whether preliminary relief is available. Based upon that statutory
language, legislative history, and case law, it will offer a rationale
for providing preliminary injunctive relief to Title VII plaintiffs in
order to preserve the status quo pending EEOC's final disposition
of their charges.
STATUTORY SCHEME

Although Title VII sets up an elaborate procedural maze through
which an individual who seeks relief from an employer's alleged
discriminatory practices must pass, it makes no specific reference
to the availability or unavailability of preliminary injunctive relief
to private plaintiffs. Nevertheless, the statutory scheme does shed
light upon the question.
The Title VII procedural maze rarely commences at the EEOC
level. Generally, if the individual's home state or locality has a law
prohibiting the alleged discriminatory practice, the individual must
file a charge there first.8 Sixty days after filing with the state or
locality, but not less than 180 days after the alleged violation,9 the
individual may file a charge under Title VII with the EEOC. 1° At
that time, the EEOC must investigate the charge and, if it finds
7. Professor Spurlock makes this point persuasively. Spurlock, Proscribing Retaliation
Under Title VI, 8 IND. L. REV. 453, 459 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Spurlock].
8. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c) (Supp. fl, 1972).
9. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c),(e) (Supp. II, 1972).
10. During the first year after the effective date of the state or local law, deferral to the
state or locality is extended to 120 days. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c) (Supp. II, 1972). EEOC
regulations do, however, allow the EEOC to receive the charge, defer it to the state or local
agency, and begin acting on the charge without another filing when the deferral period has
ended. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.12 (1975). The United States Supreme Court has countenanced this
procedure. Love v. Pullman Co., 404 U.S. 522 (1972).
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"reasonable cause to believe that the charge is true,"" it must "endeavor to eliminate any such alleged unlawful employment practice
by informal methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion."' 2
If the EEOC has not secured a conciliation agreement within 30
days after the charge has been filed, the EEOC may file an action
in the appropriate United States District Court. 3 If no action has
been filed by the EEOC and no conciliation agreement has been
entered into 180 days after the charge has been filed, the charging
party may request a notice of right to sue." After receiving this socalled "Right to Sue Letter," the charging party then has 90 days
in which to file an action in federal court.'5
The 1972 Amendments to Title VII also give the EEOC the power
to seek preliminary injunctive relief pending its final disposition of
a charge.'" This power may be utilized without compliance with the
above-mentioned 30-day or 180-day time requirements for a civil
7
action on the merits.'
THE

EEOC

AND PRELIMINARY RELIEF

Since the 1972 Amendments granted the EEOC power to seek
preliminary relief, the Commission has used its power sparingly at
best; preliminary relief has been sought in only 21 cases.'" This
11.

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (Supp. I, 1972).
12. Id.
13. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (Supp. II, 1972), amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1970). The
possibility that the EEOC will have secured a conciliation agreement in 30 days is highly
unlikely. See text accompanying notes 18 through 30 infra.
14. Id. The former § 2000e-5(e) gave the EEOC power to extend the 30-day EEOC deferral
period to 60 days "upon a determination by the Commission that further efforts to secure
voluntary compliance are warranted." By regulation, the EEOC extended that period to 60
days in every case. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.25(a) (1970). Again, it is highly unlikely that within 180
days after the filing of the charge the EEOC will have taken any action whatever, much less
secured a conciliation agreement or filed an action. See text accompanying notes 18 through
30 infra.
15. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (Supp. II, 1972).
16. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(2) (Supp. II, 1972) provides, in pertinent part:
Whenever a charge is filed with the Commission and the Commission concludes
on the basis of a preliminary investigation that prompt judicial action is necessary
to carry out the purposes of this Act, the Commission . . . may bring an action
for appropriate temporary or preliminary relief pending final disposition of such
charge.
17. The language "[wihenever a charge is filed with the Commission," 42 U.S.C. § 2000e5(f)(2) (Supp. II, 1972), makes this clear.
18. This figure is as of March, 1976, 4 full years after power to seek preliminary injunctive
relief was granted to the EEOC. Interview with Charles L. Thomas, Special Assistant to
EEOC General Counsel Abner W. Sibal on August 18, 1976. See also Report by EEOC
Chairman Lowell W. Perm, to Senate Labor Committee on Commission's Current Status and
Projected Improvements, BNA FAIR EMP. PRAC., SUMMARY OF LATEST DEVELOPMENTS, No. 279-
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figure is nothing less than astounding, considering the enormous
number of cases filed with the EEOC. By the end of fiscal 1975,
EEOC had received over 280,000 charges. Nearly two-thirds of these
were filed after the 1972 Amendments." In fiscal 1975 alone, 71,000
charges were filed; at the end of fiscal 1975, the Commission's then
current inventory of charges totalled 106,700.20
Congress itself has mandated that the EEOC "not hesitate"', to
seek preliminary injunctive relief when it deems such relief necessary. Considering this mandate, the vast number of cases filed
under Title VII, and the probability of harm to individuals and to
the public interest if the status quo is not maintained,2 it is impossible that "prompt judicial action" has been required in only 21 of the
nearly 200,000 cases filed since the 1972 Amendments. A more plausible explanation for EEOC's failure to act centers on that organization's inefficiency and inadequate staffing. The District Directors,23
vested with authority to determine whether preliminary injunctive
relief is necessary,24 do not independently screen cases as they come
in to determine whether such relief should be sought. 5 It may take
two years after a complaint is filed for the EEOC to even investigate
it; 26 the bulk of the EEOC's caseload at the end of fiscal 1975, some
27
94,190 cases, has not been fully investigated.
Even if a charging party requests that the EEOC seek relief, and
persuades the District Director to make a determination that relief
is necessary to carry out the purposes of Title VII, the EEOC has
erected its own procedural maze through which the request must
make its way. After the District Director makes an initial determination, the approval of four more persons or groups must be obtained. The District Director first forwards the case to the appropriate Regional Litigation Center. If the Regional Litigation Center
Part II 24 (October 30, 1975) [hereinafter cited as Report]. At the time the Report was made,
20 requests for preliminary injunctive relief had been filed by the EEOC.
19. Report, supra note 18, at 2, 12, 13.
20. Id. at 12, 13.
21. 118 CONG. REC. S 3462 (daily ed. March 6, 1972) ("section-by-section" analysis
agreed to by the Conference Committee of the House and Senate on February 29, 1972); 118.
CONG. REC. H 1962 (daily ed. March 8, 1972) ("section-by-section" analysis).
22. See note 7 supra and accompanying text.
23. The EEOC has 32 District Offices, each headed by a District Director. It is in the
appropriate District Office that an individual files a charge.
24. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.25a (1975).
25. See generally CCH 1976 EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL.
26. H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1971). The Commission has now taken
steps to shorten this time. The current goal is to "reduce the backlog to such a level that
charging parties will, on the average, have to wait no longer than 12 months for resolution of
321.
their charges." CCH 1976 EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL
27. Report, supra note 18, at 12.
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approves suit, it prepares the necessary papers and forwards them
to the Litigation Services Branch. That Branch then makes a recommendation to the Associate General Counsel, Trial Division. The
Associate General Counsel reviews the case and makes a recommendation to the Commission. Then, unless the majority of the EEOC
Commissioners place a hold on the recommendation, the petition
for preliminary relief may finally be filed by the Regional Litigation
Center.2 8 Recognizing the EEOC's enormous backlog of charges and
the procedural requirements set out above, District Directors have
not been making such requests except in the most egregious of circumstances when charging parties have been particularly vocal.
For these and whatever other reasons involved, and regardless of
the congressional mandate that the EEOC not hesitate to seek relief, it is apparent from the EEOC's past performance that it will
not take primary responsibility for enforcing Title VII for individual
complainants.2 9 The EEOC has recognized its inability to deal with
the vast number of complaints filed with it, and instead of seeking
new ways to redress individual complainants' rights, has made a
conscious decision to shift its focus away from individuals towards
eliminating systematic discrimination through administrative regulation and so-called "pattern and practice" suits."0 In order to fully
effectuate the purposes of the statute and to avoid probable irreparable harm, "prompt judicial action" in the form of preliminary
injunctive relief will have to be requested in the future, as in the
past, primarily by private individuals. How will the courts respond
to such requests?
DREW V. LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE CO. AND SUBSEQUENT CASES

The first court to squarely face the issue of the availability of
interim injunctive relief pending EEOC action did so in a case involving quite unusual facts. Unfortunately, due primarily to the
facts involved, its holding rests on principles of questionable precedential value.
The plaintiff in Drew v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. 3 filed a sex
discrimination charge against Liberty Mutual with the EEOC on
28. CCH 1976 EEOC GENERAL COUNSEL MANUAL
10,050-58.
29. As of October of 1975, the EEOC had authorized only 695 actions. Only 124 of these
had been settled at that time. Report, supra note 18, at 24.
30. Blumrosen, The Crossroads For Equal Employment Opportunity: Incisive Administration or Indecisive Bureaucracy, 49 NOTRE DAME LAW. 46, 51-53, 58-62 (1973-74)
[hereinafter cited as Blumrosen]; Spurlock, supra note 7, at 455-58; Report, supra note 18,
at 2.
31. 480 F.2d 69 (5th Cir. 1973).
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April 6, 1972. She was fired the next day. Twelve days later, on April
19, 1972, she filed a complaint in district court requesting temporary
relief ordering her reinstatement pending the EEOC's final disposition of her charge.32 Liberty Mutual moved to dismiss." At the initial hearing on May 4, the trial court expressed "strong doubt" as
to whether an individual could maintain an action in light of the
provisions of § 2000e-5(f)(2) granting the EEOC the right to seek
preliminary relief.34 On May 12, 1972, the EEOC filed its own com3
plaint under (f)(2) seeking the same relief plaintiff Drew sought. 1
In that latter action the EEOC prevailed; Drew was ordered reinstated on May 30, 1972.31
Plaintiff Drew had amended her individual complaint on May 23,
1972, alleging that the EEOC issued her a Right to Sue Letter on
May 18, 1972. 31 Nevertheless, the district court dismissed her complaint, holding that she had no statutory right to proceed under
(f)(2), and that her Right to Sue Letter was of no effect as it was
issued long before the expiration of 180 days after her complaint was
filed with the EEOC, as is required by (f)(1). 31 The court did not
decide whether (f)(2) defines the exclusive procedure available in
employment discrimination cases. Because the EEOC did take advantage of its (f)(2) powers, seeking relief for Drew, her independent
' 39
action was held to be "superfluous.
Plaintiff Drew appealed. Although she had already been reinstated, she prevailed in her argument before the Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit that the case was not moot because she was
ordered to pay costs in her individual action and because her attorney was not awarded counsel fees.'"
The court of appeals framed the issue in a way that allowed it to
ignore many of the procedural and substantive issues involved and
required only one logical conclusion. The court asked simply
whether the 1972 Amendments, which gave the EEOC the right to
32. 5 FEP Cases 779 (N.D. Ga. 1972), rev'd, 480 F.2d 69 (5th Cir. 1973), rehearing denied,
480 F.2d 924 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 935 (1974).
33. Presumably defendant's motion could have been based upon Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(1), (6), and (7). The motion could also have contained a defense under Rule
19, for failure to join an indispensible party, the EEOC.
34. 480 F.2d at 71.
35. EEOC v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 475 F.2d 579 (5th Cir. 1973).
36. Id.
37. 5 FEP Cases at 781. The EEOC trial attorney in the case convinced the Atlanta
District Director to issue the letter prior to the expiration of 180 days after filing with EEOC.
With regard to the propriety of this action, see text accompanying notes 138 through 143 infra.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 782.
40. 480 F.2d at 72.
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proceed for temporary relief, made such a provision the exclusive
means by which a person in Ms. Drew's position could be protected
from irreparable harm. Refusing to hold that congressional silence
destroyed what the court assumed was an existing right of action,
it answered the question in the negative and reversed the trial court.
The initial analytical problem with the court's opinion is its assumption that Ms. Drew would have had a right to preliminary
relief pending the EEOC's disposition prior to the 1972 Amendments. Its assumption is based, not upon any Title VII case, but
entirely upon its application of the holding in Sanders v. Dobbs
House, Inc.4 to the facts presented in Drew. Sanders was an action
brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, which gives every person the right
"as is enjoyed by white citizens,"4 to make and enforce contracts.
Although § 1981 does not prescribe a private remedy, the court in
Sanders held that it had jurisdiction under the declaratory provisions of § 1981 and the general civil rights jurisdictional statute.
Therefore, it could fashion an equitable remedy to vindicate the
rights granted by § 1981. 41
The flaw in the analogy is that plaintiff Drew's situation was
unlike the situation present in Sanders. Title VII, unlike § 1981,
does create a private right of action and does give the federal court
jurisdiction to grant broad remedies. But Title VII, again unlike §
1981, erects certain procedural requirements that must be met before the rights set out therein can be vindicated. The Sanders argument as used in Drew is, instead, more analagous to an argument
in favor of direct access to the courts under Title VII without going
through the procedural maze erected by Title VII (i.e., an argument
that a court can take independent jurisdiction under the declaratory
provisions of Title VII, as the court did in Sanders, without any
reference to the EEOC, and, once it has jurisdiction, can fashion the
appropriate remedy). While this analysis has much to commend it,
no court accepted it prior to the 1972 Amendments and no court has
accepted it since.44 In fact, the Drew court, in a footnote, concedes
41. 431 F.2d 1097 (5th Cir. 1970).
42. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970).
43. 431 F.2d 1097 (5th Cir. 1970).
44. Direct court access under Title VII has been urged by one law review commentator.
Note, Discriminationin Employment and in Housing: Private Enforcement Provisionsof the
Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and 1968, 82 HARV. L. REV. 834, 852-55 (1969) [hereinafter cited as
Discrimination in Employment]. However, that commentator noted that direct access had
been rejected at that time by both courts and commentators. The United States Supreme
Court has now indicated that filing a charge with the EEOC is a jurisdictional prerequisite
to suit. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 798 (1973). See also cases cited at
2 A. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINAION § 49.31 (1975) and Developments in the

58
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as much. 5
Nor can the Drew court's decision be based in any way on plaintiff
Drew's Right to Sue Letter, issued prior to the expiration of 180 days
following the filing of her complaint with the EEOC. The court
never mentioned Drew's Right to Sue Letter nor did it discuss
whether a letter issued early is proper. The court simply ignored the
letter and assumed that Drew's charge was still pending in the
EEOC.46
Aside from the vague argument referred to above, the Drew court
never actually faced the issue as to the basis for its jurisdiction.
Because of the unusual procedural posture of the case, the court did
not have to confront the issue because the injunction was actually
granted to the EEOC. Since all of the elements required for injunctive relief were satisfied in EEOC v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.,
the Liberty Mutual court clearly did have jurisdiction of the action
under section (f)(2); hence, discussion of the jurisdictional basis was
not crucial to the decision in Drew." For this reason, Drew's value
as precedent is questionable.
Law-Employment Discriminationand Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARv. L.
REV. 1109, 1202-04 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Developments].
Counsel for Title VII plaintiffs should be alert to the possibility that the discriminatory
conduct might be actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, 1983, or under state law. In a § 1981
or § 1983 action, preliminary relief is available without the procedural encumbrances of Title
VII. As to those plaintiffs to whom it applies, it is available in addition to, not in lieu of, Title
VII. See, e.g., Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works, Int'l Harvester Co., 427 F.2d 476 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 911 (1970); Johnson v. City of Cincinnati, 450 F.2d 796 (6th Cir. 1971).
Preliminary injunctive relief might also be more readily available under state law. See, e.g.,
MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN., ch. 151B § 9 (1975-76 Cum. Ann. Pocket Part).
45. It must be remembered that this is not an action brought by Ms. Drew
for a final adjudication of her right to be protected against the alleged discriminatory conduct of the defendant. That matter is being considered by the Commission in the usual course. She normally would not be permitted to file a suit on
the merits unless the Commission had been unable for a period of 180 days to
effect conciliation.
480 F.2d at 73 n.5.
46. The court stated: "The 180-day provision, of course, does not apply here, because the
action brought by Ms. Drew is merely one to seek temporary relief pending the action of the
Commission." Id. The court may have recognized that if its decision had been based in any
way on the Right to Sue Letter, its decision may not have been to grant relief pending EEOC
action, as it is questionable whether the EEOC has the right to proceed at all after a Right
to Sue Letter has issued. At least one court has asserted that once the letter issues, the EEOC
can no longer take any action. EEOC v. Pacific Press Publishing Ass'n, 535 F.2d 1182 (9th
Cir. 1976). Contra, EEOC v. Cleveland Mills Co., 502 F.2d 153 (4th Cir. 1974). See also Case
Comment, 6 TEXAS TECH L. REV. 1163 (1975).
47. The court specifically held:
Ilin the limited class of cases, such as the present, in which irreparable injury
is shown and likelihood of ultimate success has been established (here this has
been determined by the trial court), the individual employee may bring her own
suit to maintain the status quo pending the action of the Commission on the basic
charge of discrimination.
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Regardless of Drew's shaky underpinnings, many courts that have
granted relief in cases subsequent to Drew based their holdings
specifically on an acceptance or rejection of the Drew court's analysis. The courts at this time are almost evenly divided on the issue
of the availability of preliminary relief."
Those courts that have refused to find a jurisdictional basis to
grant relief have based their holdings on one or more of several
arguments. First, a number of courts have criticized the concept of
"partial" jurisdiction utilized in Drew, stating that since they do
not have jurisdiction over the underlying cause of action, they cannot provide preliminary injunctive relief.49 Second, some courts
have stated that the 180-day period is a "statutorily required cooling
off and conciliation period" which should be judicially enforced.50
480 F.2d at 72. If applied to the usual case, this would require the court to hear the injunction
request itself prior to deciding whether it has jurisdiction. The appropriateness of such an
approach is questionable. The court either has jurisdiction or it does not, regardless of the
strength of plaintiff's case on the substantive issues.
In the end Liberty Mutual was ordered to pay costs in the EEOC action and in the Drew
action as well. It must have been small comfort that plaintiff's counsel fees had to be paid
only once. Section 2000e-5(k) allows an award of attorney fees to the prevailing party as part
of costs, but excepts the EEOC from this award.
48. Relief held to be available: Hochstadt v. Worcester Foundation, 11 FEP Cases 1426
(D. Mass.), aff'd, No. 76-1019, (1st Cir. Sept. 23, 1976) (here, the court denied defendants'
motion to dismiss, but also denied the injunction request as plaintiff did not show she was
likely to prevail on the merits); Westerlund v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Co., Civil No. C75-1639-OJC (N.D. Cal., October 2, 1975); Lewis v. FMC Corp., 11 FEP Cases 31 (N.D. Cal.
1975); Everett v. Scott Lad Foods, Civil No. 75-406C(3) (E.D. Mo. July 2, 1975); Baxter v.
Sharpe, 10 FEP Cases 1159 (W.D.N.C. 1975); Hyland v. Kenner Products Co., 10 FEP Cases
367 (S.D. Ohio 1974); Bauman v. Union Oil Co., 400 F. Supp. 1021 (N.D. Cal. 1973) (dicta).
See Faro v. New York University, 502 F.2d 1229 (2d Cir. 1974); Ingram v. First Wisconsin
National Bank, 10 FEP Cases 870 (N.D. Ala. 1974); Commonwealth v. Operating Engineers,
Local 542, 347 F. Supp. 268 (E.D. Pa. 1972). In these cases preliminary injunctive relief was
held to be available, but it is not clear from the courts' opinions in Faro and Ingram whether
the 180-day waiting period had passed and Right to Sue Letters had issued. In Operating
Engineers, Title VII was held to be one of five alternate grounds for granting a preliminary
injunction. The opinion in that case does not state whether any filing with the EEOC had
been made at all. See also Parks v. Dunlop, 517 F.2d 785 (5th Cir. 1975); Parks v. Brennan,
389 F. Supp. 790 (N.D. Ga. 1974) and Donald v. Ray, 377 F. Supp. 986 (E.D. Tenn. 1974),
involving public employees for whom there is no (f)(2) remedy.
Relief held not available: Jerome v. Viviano Food Co., Inc., 489 F.2d 965 (6th Cir. 1974);
Troy v. Shell Oil Co., 378 F. Supp. 1042 (E.D. Mich. 1974), appeal dismissed as moot, 419
F.2d 403 (6th Cir. 1975); Nottelson v. A.O. Smith Corp., 397 F. Supp. 928 (E.D. Wisc. 1975);
Collins v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 376 F. Supp. 979 (E.D. Okla. 1974). Cf. Townsend v. The Exxon Company, Civil No. 76-1961-M (D. Mass. Sept. 2, 1976); Gradillas v.
Hughes Aircraft Co., 407 F. Supp. 865 (D. Ariz. 1975); Vaughan v. Chrysler Corp., 382 F.
Supp. 143 (E.D. Mich. 1974).
49. Troy v. Shell Oil Co., 378 F. Supp. 1042, 1048 (E.D. Mich. 1974), appeal dismissed
as moot, 519 F.2d 403 (6th Cir. 1975); Nottelson v. A.O. Smith Corp., 397 F. Supp. 928, 933
(E.D. Wisc. 1975).
50. Jerome v. Viviano Food Co., Inc., 489 F.2d 965, 966 (6th Cir. 1974). See also Troy v.
Shell Oil Co., 378 F. Supp. 1042 (E.D. Mich. 1974), appeal dismissed as moot, 519 F.2d 403
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Third, others rely upon the comprehensive nature of the Title VII
Amendments to sustain a finding that only the EEOC can seek
preliminary relief.5" Fourth, Drew has been held to be factually distinguishable from subsequent cases because plaintiff Drew had an
unchallenged Right to Sue Letter, 5 because plaintiff Drew alleged
a violation of the retaliation provisions of Title VII rather than the
other discrimination provisions,5 3 or because there was no existing
employment relationship between the parties. 4
Notwithstanding the doubtful validity of the Drew court's reasoning, it is urged that the courts that have refused to find a jurisdictional basis to grant relief have misconstrued Title VII. There is a
sound and persuasive rationale, consistent with Title VII and the
congressional purposes in enacting it, for granting preliminary relief
in all types of Title VII cases pending the EEOC's disposition of the
charges. That rationale cannot, however, be based simply upon the
desirability of providing remedies to vindicate rights, as was apparently the case in Drew. Rather, it must be based upon the generally
recognized power of the federal courts to grant interim relief in aid
of administrative processes and the absence of language in Title VII
itself indicating that Congress intended to take away that power in
Title VII cases.
FEDERAL COURTS' JURISDICTION TO GRANT INTERIM RELIEF PENDING
ACTION BY ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES5 5

The courts that have refused to accept jurisdiction in Title VII
(6th Cir. 1975); Nottelson v. A. 0. Smith Corp., 397 F. Supp. 928, 930 (E.D. Wisc. 1975).
51. Jerome v. Viviano Food Co., Inc., 489 F.2d 965, 966 (6th Cir. 1974); Troy v. Shell Oil
Co., 378 F. Supp. 1042, 1047 (E.D. Mich. 1974), appeal dismissed as moot, 519 F.2d 403 (6th
Cir. 1975); Nottelson v. A. 0. Smith Corp., 397 F. Supp. 928, 931-32 (E.D. Wisc. 1975);
Collins v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 376 F. Supp. 979, 981-82 (E.D. Okla. 1974).
52. Collins v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 376 F. Supp. 979, 981 (E.D. Okla. 1974).
This argument is not persuasive as Drew did not hinge in any way on the plaintiffs Right to
Sue Letter.
53. Townsend v. The Exxon Company, Civil No. 76-1961-M 5 (D. Mass. Sept. 2, 1976);
Jerome v. Viviano Food Co., Inc., 489 F.2d 965, 966 (6th Cir. 1974); Vaughn v. Chrysler Corp.,
382 F. Supp. 143, 147 (E.D. Mich. 1974). But cf Nottelson v. A. 0. Smith Corp., 397 F. Supp.
928, 932 (E.D. Wisc. 1975). There is no basis in the statute or the legislative history supporting
the proposition that retaliation claims should be treated any differently than claims for
discrimination as to race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
54. Townsend v. The Exxon Company, Civil No. 76-1961-M 5 (D. Mass. Sept. 2, 1976);
Jerome v. Viviano Food Co., Inc., 489 F.2d 965, 966 (6th Cir. 1974). However, whether there
is an existing employment relationship between the parties has nothing to do with the court's
jurisdiction. This fact is relevant only as it relates to whether the plaintiff has shown he or
she is going to be irreparably harmed pendente lite and whether it is appropriate for the court
at the preliminary injunction stage to grant "affirmative" relief, rather than to just preserve
the status quo ante.
55. For a complete discussion of this general subject from which the historical basis set
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preliminary injunction requests are undoubtedly correct when they
state that the federal district courts cannot simply grant injunctions
where there is no underlying cause of action over which the courts
have jurisdiction. 6 But it is an entirely different matter to decide
whether a federal court has the power to grant interim injunctive
relief pending an administrative agency's disposition of a case when
that court is directed by statute to make the final decision in the
case.
It has long been settled that federal district courts may issue
injunctions in pending cases and stays pending appeals to preserve
the status quo, and that the courts of appeals and the United States
Supreme Court also have the power to stay district court orders
pending appeal. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure specifically
recognize this power." This power had earlier been held to be one
of the inherent powers of congressionally created courts;" it was
confirmed by statute as early as 1789. The so-called All Writs Act,
first enacted as section 14 of the Judiciary Act of 1789,11 empowers
all congressionally created courts to "issue all writs necessary or
appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to
the usages and principles of law." 60
In 1942, in the case of Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC,6 the
United States Supreme Court held that the courts of appeals, empowered by statute to review the decisions of the Federal Communications Commission, have the authority to stay administrative orders pending court review. This power, according to the Court, is
"as old as the judicial system of the nation;"" it is based upon the
courts' "traditional equipment for the administration of justice," 3
codified as early as "the very first Judiciary Act." 4
It has also been held that the courts of appeals need not have
out herein for the power of federal courts to grant interim relief has been drawn see L. JAFFE,
JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 654-86 (1965) [hereinafter cited as JAFFE].
56. See note 49 supra. See also C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS § 7 (1971) ("The federal courts
• . . cannot be courts of general jurisdiction. They are empowered to hear only such cases as
are within the judicial power of the United States, as defined in the Constitution, and have
been entrusted to them by a jurisdictional grant by Congress.")
57. FED. R. Civ. P. 62, 65; FED. R. App. P. 8.
58. See JAFFE, supra note 55, at 656-59, especially cases cited at nn. 14, 16, 17, 19.
59. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. XX, § 14, 1 Stat. 81.
60. 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1970). It has been held that this power includes the power to issue
an injunction. Stell v. Savannah-Chatham County Bd. of Ed., 318 F.2d 425 (5th Cir. 1963);
United States v. Western Pa. Sand & Gravel Ass'n, 114 F. Supp. 158 (W.D. Pa. 1953).
61. 316 U.S. 4 (1942).
62. Id. at 17.
63. Id. at 9-10.
64. Id, at 10 n.4.
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present jurisdiction over a cause of action to issue writs in aid of
their appellate jurisdiction over district court cases. 5 The reasoning
behind this principle is sound. First, the All Writs Act referred to
above does not specifically limit that power to cases in which the
court has present jurisdiction. Second, the power must be exercisable as incidental to the court's ultimate jurisdiction because, as
was asserted by a unanimous Court in the case of Roche v. Evaporated Milk Association:" "Otherwise the appellate jurisdiction
could be defeated and the purpose of the statute authorizing the
writ thwarted by unauthorized action of the district court obstructing the appeal."67
This reasoning has been extended to cover administrative agency
rulings. In the case of FTC v. Dean Foods, Co.," the Federal Trade
Commission asked the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit to
enjoin a merger until the Commission could determine the legality
of the merger under the antitrust laws ."The United States Supreme
Court held that the court of appeals had jurisdiction over the request because jurisdiction under the All Writs Act "extends to the
potential jurisdiction of the appellate court where an appeal is not
then pending but may be later perfected." 7' Furthermore, even
though the Commission had not been given express statutory authority to request preliminary relief, this power was held to be "incidental" to those functions Congress did give the Commission.'
"Without standing to secure injunctive relief, and thereby safeguard
its ability to order an effective divestiture of acquired properties,"
said the Court, "the Commission's efforts would be frustrated.""
Jurisdiction was thus upheld not only to protect the potential jurisdiction of the court of appeals but also to protect the primary jurisdiction of the federal agency.
Although the action in Dean Foods was brought by the Federal
Trade Commission and not by a private party, there appears to be
65. JAFF, supra note 55, at 659 and cases cited at nn. 27 and 28 therein. The cases of La
Buy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249 (1947), Ex parte United States, 287 U.S. 241 (1932),
and McClellan v. Carland, 217 U.S. 268 (1910) all involved the issuance of writs of mandamus
by either the United States Supreme Court or a court of appeals requiring a district court (a
district court judge sitting as a judge of the court of appeals in McClellan) to take certain
action. In each case the court issuing the writ did not have present jurisdiction over the cause
of action; in each case, the Court held that issuance was proper in aid of the court's potential
appellate jurisdiction under the All Writs Act as then in force.
66. 319 U.S. 21 (1943).
67. Id. at 25.
68. 356 F.2d 481 (7th Cir. 1965), rev'd, 384 U.S. 597 (1966).
69. Id.
70. 384 U.S. at 603.
71. Id. at 606.
72. Id. at n.5.
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no reason, absent specific statutory exclusion, for a different result
when the request is made by a private party, assuming the plaintiff
meets all the requirements for injunctive relief." This principle was
specifically upheld by the United States Supreme Court in the case
of Sampson v. Murray,7 4 although ultimate relief in that case was
denied."
The jurisdiction of the federal courts in these cases was not "partial" jurisdiction.76 The courts in Scripps-Howard, Dean Foods,
Roche, and Sampson had potential jurisdiction over an underlying
cause of action and had the power to make the final decision in each
of these cases, just as the federal district courts asked to grant
preliminary injunctive relief will have over Title VII cases. In fact,
in a Title VII case, the argument should be even stronger. In such a
case, the federal district court does not merely have power to review
the agency's decision; it is empowered to hear the case de novo on
its merits. The only power the court lacks is present power to make
that decision on the merits. Only as to the final decision must the
court await the exercise by the agency of its primary jurisdiction.7 7
TITLE

VII DOES

NOT DIVEST THE FEDERAL COURTS OF JURISDICTION TO

PROVIDE PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIVE RELIEF PENDING

EEOC's

DISPOSITION OF A CHARGE

Although the federal district courts do generally have jurisdiction
to grant interim relief pending action by federal agencies, if the
73. Indeed, Professor Jaffe argues that when relief is sought by a private party the case
for recognizing the power to preserve the status quo is stronger. JAFFE, supra note 55, at 677.
Caution should be used, however, in taking this argument too far when the administrative
agency also has the authority to seek relief.
74. 415 U.S. 61 (1974). One court in a Title VII case did properly use this analysis. See
Hyland v. Kenner Products Co., 10 FEP Cases 367, 377 (S.D. Ohio 1974).
75. 415 U.S. 61 (1974). In Sampson, the majority paid lip service to the principles of the
All Writs Act "as a preservative of jurisdiction," and countenanced its use in Dean Foods
where, if injunctive relief were not available, the practical disappearance of one entity by
merger would render the Commission helpless to take any action if it found the proposed
merger violated the antitrust laws. However, when the Dean rule was applied to a woman
who alleged she was fired from her government job unlawfully, the majority agreed that her
deprivation of income for an indefinite period of time and the damage to her reputation from
a wrongful discharge did not constitute irreparable harm. The majority did not recognize that
Imlany employees may lack substantial savings, and a loss of income for more
than a few weeks' time might seriously impair their ability to provide themselves
with the essentials of life. ...
Id. at 101 (Marshall, J., dissenting). It is hoped that this case will be limited to its specific
facts. However, counsel for Title VII plaintiffs should be aware of Sampson and the possibility
that a strong irreparable harm showing might be required. See, e.g., Morgan v. Fletcher, 518
F.2d 236 (5th Cir. 1975) and note 144 infra.
76. See note 49 supra.
77. Developments, supra note 44, at 1257.

Loyola University Law Journal

[Vol. 8

applicable statute precludes relief, this overriding consideration
must lead the court to conclude that Congress has divested it of
8
jurisdiction.1
Prior to the 1972 Amendments, Title VII contained no express
exclusion of preliminary relief to private parties. The argument has
been made, however, and accepted by some courts, that such an
exclusion can be implied by the language of (f)(1) (180-day deferral
provision) and the post-1972 (f)(2) (EEOC granted power to seek
preliminary relief).7" These provisions will be discussed separately.
Section (f)(1)
Section (f)(1) provides, in pertinent part:
If a charge filed with the Commission . . .is dismissed by the
Commission, or if within one hundred eighty days from the filing
of such charge or the expiration of any period of reference under
subsection (c) or (d), whichever is later, the Commission has not
filed a civil action under this section . . . or the Commission has
not entered into a conciliation agreement to which the person
aggrieved is a party, the Commission . . .shall so notify the
person aggrieved and within ninety days after the giving of such
notice a civil action may be brought against the respondent
named in the charge ...."I
The pre-1972 statute was similar except that, as has been stated,
the deferral period to the EEOC was only 30 days.8 '
There were no cases under the pre-1972 statute directly holding
that preliminary relief was either available or not available prior to
the expiration of the EEOC deferral period. In Bowe v. Colgate
Palmolive Co.,82 a class action in which only one class member had
filed with the EEOC and obtained a Right to Sue Letter, one district court did hold that: "It would be unrealistic to require an em78. Arrow Transportation Co. v. Southern Railway Co., 372 U.S. 658, 667-69 (1963). See
also FTC v. Dean Foods Co., 384 U.S. 597, 608 (1966) ("In the absence of explicit direction
from Congress we have no basis to say that an agency charged with protecting the public
interest cannot request that a court of appeals, having jurisdiction to review administrative
orders, exercise its express authority under the All Writs Act to issue temporary injunctions
as may be necessary to protect its own jurisdiction"); Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC,
316 U.S. 4, 11 (1942). ("These controlling considerations [that irreparable damage could
occur while litigation is pending] compel the assumption that Congress would not, without
clearly expressing such a purpose, deprive the Court of Appeals of its customary power to stay
orders under review.").
79. See notes 50 and 51 supra.
80. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (Supp. II, 1972).
81. See note 14 supra.
82. 272 F. Supp. 332 (S.D. Ind. 1967), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir.
1969).
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ployee whose rights are threatened with irreparable harm to exhaust
his remedies before the EEOC prior to seeking injunctive relief from
the Court. 5' 3 On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
reached the same result, but on much more narrow grounds. The
court reasoned that the purposes of filing with the EEOC, to give
notice to the charged party and to give the EEOC the opportunity
to determine the adequacy of the charge and to seek voluntary compliance, were properly effectuated by one class member filing a
charge."
In Rios v. Enterprise Association Steam fitters,85 three plaintiffs
who complied with the EEOC filing requirements were granted preliminary injunctive relief. A fourth plaintiff, Rutledge, filed with the
EEOC and then brought suit before he was entitled to receive a
Right to Sue Letter. Denying an injunction, the court stated:
And even if the complete bypassing of the EEOC may be allowable, it does not follow that a plaintiff may invoke the help of
that agency and then short-circuit its efforts by premature resort
8
to the federal court.
Regardless of this language, Rios is not really persuasive precedent
for a holding that preliminary relief prior to the issuance of a Right
to Sue Letter is not available. The court's decision was bolstered by
the fact that plaintiff Rutledge filed his complaint with the EEOC
after the expiration of the time allowed for filing by the statute.
Moreover, the court also found that Rutledge was quite unlikely to
succeed on the merits of his claim.87
The few other pre-1972 cases that involved procedural aspects of
the availability of preliminary injunctive relief were cases in which
the plaintiffs had complied with EEOC procedures and had received
prior Right to Sue Letters. 8 Thus, whether (f)(1) precludes an indi83. Id. at 338.
84. 416 F.2d at 720.
85. 326 F. Supp. 198 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
86. Id. at 204.
87. Id.
88. See, e.g., Culpepper v. Reynolds Metals Co., 421 F.2d 888 (5th Cir. 1970) and Rios v.
Enterprise Ass'n Steamfitters, 326 F. Supp. 198 (S.D. N.Y. 1971). See also Murry v. American
Standard, Inc., 488 F.2d 529 (5th Cir. 1973). These cases are not applicable to the issue
discussed herein because in all three cases preliminary relief was granted by a court that had
present jurisdiction over the underlying cause of action and the jurisdiction to grant relief
was incidental to that present jurisdiction.
However, the Culpepper court did rely not only upon its inherent power to grant preliminary relief in pending cases, but also upon the language of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g), which
provides, in pertinent part: "If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged
in an unlawful employment practice charged in the complaint, the court may enjoin the
respondent from engaging in such unlawful employment practice." If this reliance is proper,
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vidual from seeking court relief prior to the expiration of the 180day EEOC deferral period cannot be determined based upon pre1972 precedent. Resolution must depend upon the purposes Congress sought to achieve by including that deferral period.
The congressional scheme designed to eradicate discrimination is
based upon a belief that seeking voluntary compliance with the
statute is an effective method to secure that goal. To a certain
extent, Congress has even indicated in (f)(1) that this method is the
preferred method, at least for a period of time. But Congress has
also recognized that in many cases voluntary compliance may not
be readily obtainable, and has indicated that at the end of the 180day EEOC deferral period, strict court enforcement is to be preferred over the informal methods of eradicating discrimination. It
appears at first blush that Congress has clearly demarcated separate areas of responsibility for the EEOC and the courts, and the
separate time periods within which each can act. Those responsibilities and time periods, however, are far from clear cut; there has
been much litigation on this issue, and not solely regarding the
availability of preliminary injunctions. One offshoot of this litigait might also provide a basis for jurisdiction in actions for preliminary relief pending the
EEOC's disposition of a charge. But the reliance on 5(g) is misplaced. It is not the court's
duty, at the preliminary injunction stage, to make a "find[ing] that the respondent has
intentionally engaged in an unlawful employment practice." Traditionally, at this stage, the
court asks only whether it is likely that the complainant will prevail on the merits.
The Culpepper court attempted to bolster its statutory argument by referring to § 2000e5(h), which provides that the anti-injunction provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29
U.S.C. §§ 101-115 "shall not apply with respect to civil actions brought by private persons."
The court stated that this provision makes it clear that preliminary injunctive relief is available, because if 5(h) referred only to permanent injunctive relief, it would be superfluous
because 5(g), the power referred to above, explicitly grants permanent relief. This argument
is not persuasive. If Congress has intended to include a statutory provision dealing with
preliminary injunctive relief, it would have done so. It is more probable that the NorrisLaGuardia language was inserted to make it clear that the provisions of that Act would not
supersede the express 5(g) provision.
Thus, a specific statutory basis for preliminary relief cannot be persuasively argued. In fact,
not even the Fifth Circuit, the court that decided Culpepper and Murry, has attempted to
extend this argument to preliminary injunction requests made pending the EEOC's disposition of a charge.
One further case should be noted. Sims v. Sheet Metal Workers, Local 65, 3 FEP Cases
712 (N.D. Ohio 1971), was before the district court on a motion for a preliminary injunction
and also a motion by certain defendants to dismiss because no EEOC charge had been filed
or Right to Sue Letter issued as to charges against those defendants. The motion to dismiss
was granted, the court holding: "[T]his Court adopts the view that a right to sue notice is a
prerequisite to filing suit in the instant case." It is not clear from the opinion whether only
the case on the merits was dismissed for this reason or whether this holding encompassed the
preliminary injunction request. It is arguable that it did not encompass the preliminary
injunction request, because, after the above statement, the court discussed plaintiffs' showing
with respect to the preliminary injunction as to those dismissed defendants, and found it
lacking.
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tion has been a clarification of the purpose of the (f)(1) deferral
period, a clarification which sheds light on whether allowing preliminary injunctive relief to private individuals would contravene Congress' intent in enacting (f)(1).
One much litigated issue has been whether an actual attempt at
conciliation by the EEOC is required before an individual can seek
court enforcement. It is now clear that if the plaintiff has filed with
the EEOC and has waited 180 days, he or she may seek court enforcement of Title VII regardless of the existence of any attempt at
conciliation or even a reasonable cause finding. 9 The basis for this
result is that Title VII plaintiffs need not postpone court action
because of EEOC inaction if the EEOC has been given an "opportunity to persuade.""
In the numerous cases deciding whether a Right to Sue Letter is
required before an individual can bring a court action seeking final
relief on the merits of the case, the EEOC's opportunity to act has
again been cited as the reason for the 180-day EEOC deferral requirement." For example, in Stebbins v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. , the court stated:
[W]e agree with the District Judge that the plaintiff could not
bypass the federal agency and apply directly to the courts for
relief. Congress established comprehensive and detailed procedures to afford the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
the opportunity to attempt by administrative action to conciliate
and mediate unlawful employment practices with a view to obtaining voluntary compliance. The plaintiff must therefore seek
his administrative remedies before instituting court action
against the alleged discriminator. 3
In class action suits the same reasoning has applied. If at least one
class member has filed with the EEOC and has a proper Right to
Sue Letter, it has been held that court action is proper. The theory
89. For a list of the numerous cases on this issue see Annot., 5 A.L.R. Fed. 334 (1970).
See also A. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 49.33 (1975); Developments, supra note
55, at 1206-07; Discriminationin Employment, supra note 44, at 850-59; Comment, Title VII:
How to Break the Law Without Really Trying, 21 CATH. U.L. REv. 103 (1971).
90. Johnson v. Seaboard Air Line Railroad Co., 405 F.2d 645, 649 (4th Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 918 (1969). See also Miller v. International Paper Co., 408 F.2d 283 (5th Cir.
1969); Dent v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co., 406 F.2d 399 (5th Cir. 1969); Watson v.
Limbach Co., 333 F. Supp. 154 (S.D. Ohio 1971).
91. See note 44 supra.
92. 382 F.2d 267 (4th Cir, 1967).
93. Id. at 268. See also Beverly v. Lone Star Lead Construction Corp., 437 F.2d 1136, 1139
(5th Cir. 1971) ("ITihe EEOC was intended to, and does, play an important role in the
legislative scheme. Potential litigants are absolutely required to take a step which affords
them at least an opportunity to reach a more amicable conciliation out of court.").
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has been that because one class member has filed with the EEOC,
the EEOC has notice of the grievances common to the class and the
concomitant opportunity to perform its duties in connection therewith. 4
The policy thus formulated was stated succinctly in the case of
EEOC v. Cleveland Mills Co. :
The 180 day period serves its apparent purpose when it limits the
time before which a private action may not be filed and thus
avoids potential interference with the Commission in the performance of its primary duties of conciliation and enforcement."
There is no evidence whatever to indicate that the 180-day deferral period was ever intended to be a "cooling off" period in which
employers would be free from judicial or EEOC sanctions. The purpose was clearly to allow the EEOC a time to employ its facilities,
if possible, to act on a charging party's complaint. It cannot be said
that allowing an action for preliminary relief preserving the status
quo pending the EEOC's disposition will in any way contravene that
purpose. The EEOC will in all respects retain its primary jurisdiction to attempt conciliation regardless of the court action. 7 In fact,
in most instances in which preliminary relief is granted, the granting of the relief will give the EEOC a better opportunity to perform
its function. In cases where plaintiffs show the probability of irreparable harm absent preservation of the status quo, preliminary
relief will give the EEOC the opportunity to act where, without such
relief, the EEOC's later attempted action would be futile. Thus,
court action would in no way short-circuit the EEOC's powers, but,
rather, would allow those powers to be utilized to their fullest extent
in eradicating discrimination as Congress intended.
Section (f)(2)
Section (f)(2) provides that "if the Commission concludes on the
basis of a preliminary investigation that prompt judicial action is
necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act" it may bring an
94. See, e.g., Miller v. International Paper Co., 408 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1969); Bowe v.
Colgate Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969); Hall v. Werthan Bag Corp., 251 F. Supp.
184 (M.D. Tenn. 1966).
95. 502 F.2d 153 (4th Cir. 1974).
96. Id. at 156.
97. Of course, the shoe will now be on the other foot. EEOC delays will now be detrimental
to the employer, rather than the employee. This is as it should be, as the charging party will
have already made a strong showing in court that he or she is likely to prevail on the merits.
It may also encourage conciliation. See Developments, supra note 55, at 1258.

19761

Preliminary Relief Under Title VII

action for temporary relief. 8 It is arguable that the provision relating to a "preliminary investigation" and a finding that "prompt
judicial action is necessary" indicates a desire on the part of Congress to keep the courts free from complaints for preliminary relief
that have not already been screened by the EEOC. 99 Employers
might also argue that the preliminary investigation requirement is
a requirement whose purpose is to protect them from what might
be baseless temporary injunction requests.
Both of these arguments must be put in their proper perspectives.
First, the overriding purposes of the 1972 Amendments were to
achieve the goal of effectively eliminating discrimination by employers and to expand the power of the EEOC.'1° Second, the legislative history demonstrates that this power under (f)(2) was to be
liberally used. The Congressional Record contains the following
analysis of (f)(2) as enacted:
The importance of preliminary relief in actions involving violations of Title VII is central to ensuring that persons aggrieved
under this title are adequately protected and that the provisions
of this Act are being followed. Where violations become apparent
and prompt judicial action is necessary to insure these provisions,
the Commission or the Attorney General, as the case may be,
should not hestitate to invoke the provisions of this subsection. 01
The analysis also provides that "[sluch actions are to be assigned
for hearing at the earliest possible date and expedited in every
way."'' 2 This language is inconsistent with the contention that the
purpose of the investigation language is to ensure that this tool will
be used sparingly to protect the courts or employers from spurious
litigation. Employers' interests are adequately protected by the traditional requirement that the plaintiff must show that he or she is
likely to prevail on the merits before a court will grant preliminary
injunctive relief. With respect to the judiciary, it suffices to say that
98. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(2) (Supp. II, 1972).
99. The court in Collins v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 376 F. Supp. 979, 983 (E.D.
Okla. 1974) grounded its decision in part upon its fear that if it granted relief it would be
flooded with requests for preliminary injunctions.
100. The only real debate in Congress concerned which means would best achieve the goal
of eliminating discrimination; the goal itself was never questioned. See Sape & Hart, Title
VII Reconsidered: The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 40 GEO. WASH. L. REv.
824 (1972). See also H.R. REP. No. 238, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1971).
101. 118 CONG. REC. S 3462 (daily ed. March 6, 1972) (emphasis added) ("section-bysection" analysis agreed to by the Conference Committee of the House and Senate on February 29, 1972); 118 CONG. REC. H 1962 (daily ed. March 8, 1972) ("section-by-section" analysis).
102. Id.
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protection of individual rights granted under federal statutes, however burdensome to the courts' already enormous caseloads, is an
integral part of their functions. Based on the legislative history, it
is more probable that the language of (f)(2) directing preliminary
investigation was not included to protect employers or the courts
from what might later prove to be baseless suits, but simply to
protect the EEOC from the requirement of requesting relief in

cases it believes do not warrant

it.

'°3

One court has stated that the very existence of (f)(2) makes the
remedy it provides "available" and that the "availability" of this
so-called "administrative remedy" necessarily precludes the right of
0 4 This argument is no more persuasive
an individual to seek relief."
than the argument that the investigation language in (f)(2) precludes individual relief. In the first place, merely because a remedy
exists on the statute books does not render it available. Considering
the EEOC's backlog and past track record,' 5 it cannot be that the
EEOC request for relief is in any way "available."'' ° If it were available, the individual would not be in court on his or her own.' 7
Furthermore, because (f)(2) exists, it does not inexorably follow
that it is an exclusive remedy. There is no doctrine that precludes
granting of more than one remedy to a complainant. In fact, Title
VII itself accords both administrative and judicial avenues of recourse to charging parties. Moreover, an individual's right to judicial recourse in other Title VII areas has never been predicated in
any way on favorable EEOC action. If the EEOC finds there are
"insufficient grounds for the Government to file a complaint," the
legislative history indicates that the individual "should not be
forced to abandon the claim."' ' Even if the EEOC finds no reason103. It is also probable that the "preliminary investigation" direction was used to clarify
that the EEOC could seek preliminary injunctive relief before it did the in-depth investigation required by § 2000e-5(b) that would lead to a reasonable cause finding.
104. Nottelson v. A. 0. Smith Corp., 397 F. Supp. 928, 931 (E.D. Wisc. 1975).
105. See text accompanying notes 18 through 30 supra.
106. The Nottelson court appears to confuse this situation with the entirely separate
situation in which equitable relief has been held not to be appropriate if a plaintiff has an
adequate remedy at law.
107. The invocation of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is also misplaced here. The very reason for the injunction to preserve the status quo is so that administrative remedies can be exhausted at a later date. The injunction is issued in aid of the
administrative processes, not in lieu of those processes. Furthermore, it is arguable that there
is no available administrative remedy here since the EEOC cannot issue status quo orders.
For an overview of the exhaustion doctrine see K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT 356-71
(1959); JAFFE, supra note 55, at 424-58.
108. 118 CONG. REc. S 3462 (daily ed. March 6, 1972) ("section-by-section" analysis
agreed to by the Conference Committee of the House and Senate on February 29, 1972); 118
CONG. REc. H 1962 (daily ed. March 8, 1972) ("section-by-section" analysis).
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able cause to credit the allegations made by a charging party, that
party retains the right to file an independent lawsuit.0 9
There is no doubt that the Congress, in enacting the 1972 Amendments, hoped that, in contrast to pre-1972 practice, the EEOC
would not only perform its task of obtaining compliance informally
but would also aggressively seek court enforcement. Presumably,
this was the purpose of extending the EEOC deferral period from
an unrealistic 30 days to 180 days."0 The analysis agreed to by the
House and Senate Conference Committee provides: "It is hoped
that recourse to the private lawsuit will be the exception and that
the vast majority of complaints will be handled through the offices
of the EEOC or the Attorney General, as appropriate.""' Notwithstanding this hope, there was also a certain pessimism, presumably
based on the EEOC's past performance."' This pessimism led the
Conference Committee to state emphatically: "As the individual's
rights to redress are paramount under the provisions of Title VII, it
is necessary that all avenues be left open for quick and effective
relief.""' This was a reiteration by the Conference Committee of
what was said in the House Report on the bill sent to the floor: "The
primary concern must be protection of the aggrieved person's option
to seek a prompt remedy in the best manner available.""'
This history clearly indicates a desire on the part of Congress to
strengthen enforcement of Title VII, not to weaken it. The essential
concern was not to foreclose any potential rights of individual complainants.
109.

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 798-809 (1973). See 2 A. LARSON,

EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 49.33 (1975), and cases cited therein.

110. See note 14 supra.
111. 118 CONG. REC. S 3462 (daily ed. March 6, 1972) ("section-by-section" analysis
agreed to by the Conference Committee of the House and Senate on February 29, 1972); 118
CONG. REC. H 1962 (daily ed. March 8, 1972) ("section-by-section" analysis). It is questionable whether this reasoning was realistic in light of Congress' knowledge of the EEOC's past
inability to perform when it had only conciliatory functions. With such a background one
wonders why Congress concluded it could properly perform conciliatory functions and seek
court enforcement.
112. See text accompanying notes 18 through 30 supra.
113. 118 CONG. REC. S 3462 (daily ed. March 6, 1972) ("section-by-section" analysis
agreed to by the Conference Committee of the House and Senate on February 29, 1972); 118
CONG. REC. H 1972 (daily ed. March 8, 1972) ("section-by-section" analysis). The bill that
reached the floor of the House and Senate gave the EEOC the power to issue judicially
enforceable cease and desist orders. Even in drafting this bill, giving the EEOC the power to
act as a "quasi-judicial agency with authority to obtain enforcement orders," the individual
right of action was retained because of the concern for prompt action to vindicate Title VII
complainants' rights. H.R. REP. No. 238, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. 2, 13 (1971).
114. H.R. REP. No. 238, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1971). One commentator has asserted
that the very creation of an administrative agency indicates a desire to expedite individuals'
complaints. Note, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 1124, 1126 (1949).

Loyola University Law Journal

[Vol. 8

In conclusion, in determining whether a court has power to grant
interim relief pending the termination of the administrative process,
according to Professor Jaffe:
We start with the proposition that presumptively a court of equity has the power to maintain the status quo where necessary
to effectuate the purposes of a statute. If the party seeking relief
will suffer irreparable injury of a sort which it is the purpose of
the statute to avoid, there is a prima facie case for relief pendente
lite. It should require fairly clear statutory language to find a
purpose to exclude the judicial power traditionally available for
such protection." 5
The United States Supreme Court supports the view that clear
statutory language must be present in order to divest the federal
courts of their traditional jurisdiction. In Dean Foods, the Court
held that a federal court with prospective jurisdiction over a cause
of action has jurisdiction to issue a preliminary injunction "[iln the
absence of an explicit direction from Congress.""' There is certainly
no such explicit direction in the 1972 Amendments.
Assuming arguendo that it is necessary to examine the congressional intent in enacting Title VII to determine whether Congress
intended that the federal courts grant preliminary relief, the examination should be undertaken with caution:
The search for significance in the silence of Congress is too often
the pursuit of a mirage. We must be wary against interpolating
our notions of policy in the interstices of legislative provisions.
Here Congress said nothing about the power of the Court of Appeals to issue stay orders under §402(b). But denial of such power
is not to be inferred merely because Congress failed specifically
to repeat the general grant of auxiliary powers to the federal
courts. " '
Here, a look at the legislative history clarifies that neither (f)(1)
nor (f)(2) were intended to divest the courts of their traditional
powers. The (f)(1) deferral period is present so that the EEOC will
have the opportunity to seek voluntary compliance with the provisions of Title VII. Preliminary injunctive relief pending such EEOC
action can only aid the EEOC in performance of its compliance
functions. The fact that the EEOC may, under (f)(2), seek relief,
does not necessarily mean that an individual cannot. The remedy
is not explicitly made exclusive. Moreover, it was added for the
supra note 55, at 685.

115.

JAFFE,

116.
117.

384 U.S. at 608.
316 U.S. at 11.
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purpose of broadening the EEOC's powers so that individuals could
be better protected from discrimination. To conclude that (f)(2)
denies an individual the right to seek preliminary relief directly
contravenes the congressional purposes in enacting the 1972
Amendments. The clear implication of the legislative history is that
artificial obstacles ought not to be placed in the way of Title VII
complainants as they attempt to enforce their rights.
As a practical matter, if the overworked and understaffed EEOC
is going to function at all in the future, individual enforcement of
Title VII will have to be encouraged." 8 There is no reason why a
private individual who has adequate representation should divert
the EEOC's feeble resources from its other tasks." 9
Congress intended to emphasize the ends to be gained by effective
enforcement of Title VII, that is, to promptly and fully eradicate
long standing discrimination and to allow all appropriate means to
obtain that goal. This being so, it must be said that the statutory
direction is to retain the power of the federal courts to grant interim
injunctive relief pending the EEOC's disposition of individual
charges, not to divest those courts of that general power.
MISCELLANEOUS CONSIDERATIONS AND SUGGESTED COURSES OF ACTION

Based upon the foregoing analysis, preliminary injunctive relief
should be made readily available to plaintiffs pending the EEOC's
disposition of their charges. However, attorneys for prospective
Title VII plaintiffs still have a number of problems to solve and
tactical decisions to make. The following is a discussion of the major
procedural issues.
Is Filing With EEOC Necessary Before Seeking PreliminaryRelief?
With few exceptions, a Title VII plaintiff will be denied preliminary relief if he or she has not filed a charge with the EEOC. It is
well-settled that in order to obtain court relief on the merits, a
plaintiff must show that the Commission has not been completely
bypassed.'2 In each and every case in which preliminary relief has
been granted, a charge had been filed with the EEOC. The very
118. Professor Blumrosen makes a strong argument that "massive prompt implementation of the law" can take place only if private plaintiffs aggressively pursue individual complaints and the EEOC is free to combat systematic discrimination. Blumrosen, supra note
30, at 53.
119. The EEOC made this argument in its memorandum filed as amicus curiae in opposition to the defendants' motion to dismiss in Hochstadt v. Worcester Foundation, 11 FEP
Cases 1426 (D. Mass.), afj'd, No. 76-1019 (lst Cir., Sept. 23, 1976).
120. See note 44 supra.
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rationale for granting relief urged herein is based upon a pending
agency claim.
Counsel should be aware, however, that there are certain recognized exceptions to this rule. The exceptions are available where it
can be shown that the lack of a filing does not affect the EEOC's
"opportunity to act."'' First, in a class action, only one class member need file with the EEOC and receive a Right to Sue Letter.'2
Second, when filing with the EEOC would be "futile," it has not
been required. For example, where the EEOC has had an opportunity to deal with the same issue involving many of the same parties
and has not done so, filing has been considered unnecessary.' 3 Also,
where a male has sued for sex discrimination and a female employee's claim against the same employer was decided in the EEOC
adversely to the male's position, filing was not required.2 4 Third,
where preliminary injunctive relief is sought because of a violation
of § 2000e-3(a) (retaliation against an employee for opposing unlawful employment practices), 25 and a charge of discrimination on the
basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin has been filed,
an additional filing has not been strictly required. The 180-day
EEOC deferral requirement has not been applied in this situation
when an action has been filed for permanent relief because of an
EEOC regulation which allows amendments to relate back to the
initial filing 26 and because the EEOC always has notice and the
"opportunity to act" as to retaliation. When it investigates any
change it always investigates possible retaliation.'1 On the same
theory, a filing relating to retaliation has not been required before
proceeding for preliminary injunctive relief.2 8
121. See text accompanying notes 89 through 97 supra.
122. See note 94 supra.
123. State v. Baugh Construction Co., 313 F. Supp. 598, 605 (W.D. Wash. 1969).
124. DeFigueiredo v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 322 F. Supp. 1384 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
125. That section provides, in pertinent part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate
against any of his employees or applicants for employment . . . because he has
made a charge, testified, assisted or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this title.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (Supp. II, 1972).
126. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.11(b) (1975). See Bauman v. Union Oil Co., 400 F. Supp. 1021, 102526 (N.D. Cal. 1973).
127. Held v. Missouri Pacific R.R. Co., 373 F. Supp. 996 (S.D. Tex. 1974); Bauman v.
Union Oil Co., 400 F. Supp. 1021 (N.D. Cal. 1973); Leisner v. New York Telephone Co., 358
F. Supp. 359 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
128. Hyland v. Kenner Products Co., 10 FEP Cases 367 (S.D. Ohio 1976). However, as
filing itself does not usually create insurmountable problems, it would be advisable to file
the retaliation charge with the EEOC. It appears that this was done in Drew. The district
court opinion indicates that two charges were filed with the EEOC, presumably the sex charge
and a retaliation charge. 5 FEP Cases at 780.
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What About State Deferral?

Prior to the decision in Love v. Pullman Co.,' 29 there was some
question as to whether the EEOC would entertain a charge prior to
the expiration of the mandatory period of deferral to state and local
equal employment commissions. The EEOC regulations allowed the
EEOC to receive the charge, defer it to the appropriate agency, and,
at the end of the deferral period, begin its statutory functions without subsequent filing.3 0 Love approved this procedure.
The existence of the 60 or 120-day deferral period should not delay
a filing for preliminary injunctive relief. A prospective plaintiff can
file with the EEOC and let the Commission defer the complaint.
The argument is hardly persuasive that interim relief would not be
in aid of the EEOC's jurisdiction simply because its action is suspended for a short period of state deferral. 3 '
There are, however, states whose statutes allow charging parties
to request that the state agency waive its jurisdiction over the complaint.' The use of this option might strengthen a plaintiff's position that the injunction is actually in aid of the EEOC's jurisdiction.
However, there are negative aspects in utilizing this mechanism.
First, the possibility of action against employers by both state and
federal agencies strengthens an employee's bargaining power with
the employer. Plaintiffs may understandably not wish to surrender
this power. Second, it is arguable that requesting that a state waive
jurisdiction constitutes a failure to proceed under the state statute
and, hence, prevents the federal court from taking jurisdiction over
a complaint.'33
129. 404 U.S. 522 (1972).
130. See note 10 supra.
131. The situation in the EEOC's requests for relief is analagous. There, by regulation,
the EEOC may seek (f)(2) relief during the state deferral period. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.12(d)
(1975).
132. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 151B, § 9 (1975-1976 Cum. Ann. Pocket Part)
which provides, in pertinent part:
Any person claiming to be aggrieved by a practice made unlawful under this
chapter. . . may, at the expiration of ninety days after the filing of a complaint
with the Commission, or sooner if a Commissioner assents in writing, bring a civil
action for damages or injunctive relief. . . . The petitioner shall notify the Commission of the filing of the action, and any complaint before the Commission shall
then be dismissed without prejudice, and the petitioner shall be barred from
subsequently bringing a complaint on the same matter before the Commission.
The Illinois Fair Employment Practices Act does not contain such a waiver provision. See
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 851 et seq. (1975 Cum. Ann. Pocket Part).
133. See, e.g., EEOC v. Union Bank, 408 F.2d 867 (9th Cir. 1968). A few Title VII plaintiffs have attempted to circumvent the 180-day EEOC deferral period completely by filing
with the EEOC and immediately asking that their charges be dismissed. Because (0(1)
allows the issuance of a Right to Sue Letter upon dismissal of a charge, in at least one case,
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The fact that a preliminary injunction request is made during the
state deferral period should not be a ground for a federal court to
deny relief; the existence of state remedies should not mandate
disallowance of a request to preserve the status quo pending administrative agency action. The same principles, namely, that relief is
in aid of the EEOC administrative process and of the court's prospective jurisdiction, and that no statutory exclusion is present,
should apply. Plaintiffs in states that allow waiver should not be
required to give up their state remedies to obtain interim relief.
Plaintiffs in other states with state or local equal employment agencies should not have to defer action for 60 to 120 days before seeking
relief.
What DocumentationShould Be Sought From EEOCPriorto Filing
a Complaint? Should an "'Early"Letter Be Requested?
If counsel determines that there is time, certainly the EEOC
should be requested to act under (f)(2). A presentation to the federal
court is demonstrably more persuasive with EEOC backing. The
EEOC's Counsel Manual indicates that requests involving retaliation for resorting to the EEOC and imminent layoff of employees
will be considered most favorably.'34 The time it will take to get a
determination from the District Director will, of course, depend on
the particular Director. Once he or she has made a decision, EEOC
regulations indicate that the subsequent decision-making process
should take no more than 6 days. 13 5 This does not, however, include
preparing the necessary papers and actually filing the action.
If the EEOC cannot act, counsel should request that the EEOC
enter the case on an amicus curiae basis. In fiscal 1975 alone, the
EEOC participated as amicus in 84 cases.'36 Counsel should also
seriously consider requesting an affidavit from the District Director
that the Commission cannot seek preliminary relief on the individual's behalf because of its workload, understaffing, etc. Although,
under the analysis urged herein, the EEOC's ability or inability to
the EEOC did dismiss the charge and did give the charging party a Right to Sue Letter. In
that case, Scott v. Southern California Gas Co., 7 FEP Cases 1030 (C.D. Cal. 1973), the court
found it had jurisdiction over the request for an injunction because, according to the court,
plaintiff had exhausted his Title VII remedies. This holding is questionable; it appears that
the plaintiff became exhausted before he had exhausted his Title VII remedies. The method
of requesting dismissal should not be relied on by counsel for Title VII complainants. They
may find that because the EEOC has not been given the required opportunity to act; their
court actions as well as their charges will be rightly dismissed.
134. CCH 1976 EEOC GENERAL COUNSEL MANUAL
10,050.
135. Id. at
10,050-58.
136. Report, supra note 18, at 24.
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act should not in any way affect an individual's right to preliminary
relief, such an affidavit is an extra precaution and could prove persuasive."'
Should an "early" letter be sought? At least three EEOC District
Offices have been issuing Right to Sue Letters prior to the expiration of the 180-day EEOC deferral period." 8 If an individual requests such a letter, those offices have granted the request and sent
along with it a statement that the EEOC has a backlog of cases and
cannot investigate the complaint within the 180-day period. Although the statute appears unambiguous that 180 days must pass
before a Right to Sue Letter can issue, at least two district courts
have held that the language of (f)(1), providing that the individual
has such a right "if within one hundred and eighty days from the
filing of such charge . . . the Commission has not filed a civil action," is open to judicial construction, and, consequently, have held
such early letters to be proper.13 In the case of Berg v. Richmond
Unified School District4 " the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
approved this procedure.
Although this flies in the face of an explicit, contrary EEOC regulation, "' it is settled in these districts, pending possible United
States Supreme Court review in Berg, that such "early" letters are
proper. In such areas, if counsel deems it tactically desirable to
abandon the EEOC altogether, this may be an appropriate course
of action." 2
137. These affidavits or letters were presented to the court in Hochstadt v. Worcester
Foundation, 11 FEP Cases 1426 (D. Mass.), aff'd, No. 76-1019 (1st Cir., Sept. 23, 1976) and
Lewis v. FMC Corp., 11 FEP Cases 31 (N.D. Cal. 1975), cases in which the courts did accept
jurisdiction.
138. Those district offices are Atlanta, San Francisco, and St. Louis.
139. Westerlund v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Co., Civil No. C-75-1639-OJC (N.D. Cal.
October 2, 1975); Lewis v. FMC Corp., 11 FEP Cases 31 (N.D. Cal. 1975); Howard v. Mercantile Commerce Trust Co., 10 FEP Cases 158 (E.D. Mo. 1974); Gary v. Industrial Indemnity
Co., 7 FEP Cases 193 (N.D. Cal. 1973); Bauman v. Union Oil Co., 400 F. Supp. 1021 (N.D.
Cal. 1973) (dicta).
In Howard, for example, the court asserted that the words "within one hundred and eighty
days" "connote some measure of flexibility, at least up to the one hundred and eightieth
day." 10 FEP Cases at 159.
140. 528 F.2d 1208 (9th Cir. 1975), petition for cert. filed, 44 U.S.L.W. 3459 (U.S. Jan.
28, 1976).
141. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.25b(c) (1975) states:
At any time after the expiration of one hundred and eighty (180) days from the
date of the filing of a charge or upon dismissal of the charge at any stage of the
proceedings an aggrieved person may demand in writing that a notice issue pursuant to § 1601.25, and the Commission shall promptly issue a notice, and provide
copies thereof and copies of the charge to all parties.
142. Preliminary injunctive relief in such an action would be readily available based upon
the cases and doctrine set out in note 88 supra.
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In other areas, even if the District Director can be persuaded,
through "conference, conciliation, and persuasion" or otherwise, to
issue such a letter, its acceptance in the courts is unlikely. The
propriety of such a letter is highly questionable, based upon traditional notions of statutory interpretation and, more importantly,
upon the directly contrary regulation promulgated by the EEOC
itself.' The recipient of such a letter may in the end have the letter
and nothing else except an enormous legal bill and wasted time in
ligitation.
The Injunction HearingItself
The substantive issues relating to the injunction hearing itself are
beyond the scope of this article.'" Counsel should be aware, however, that he or she is entitled to access to the EEOC's files in order
to prepare the case. 4 ' Most often the file will contain the charge and
little else concerning the client's specific case at this stage. However, counsel is entitled to the employer's EEO-ls (Employer Information Reports) and other files involving the same employer that
the EEOC deems "relevant or material."' 46 This information may
be helpful in establishing the client's likelihood of success on the
merits.
143. Early in 1976 the EEOC did draft a new regulation allowing for the issuance of Right
to Sue Letters prior to the expiration of the 180-day EEOC deferral period. This regulation
was never promulgated, presumably because of the direct conflict with the statute.
144. With regard to the substantive elements, the plaintiff will have to show a likelihood
of success on the merits and, to a greater or lesser degree, that there is a probability of
irreparable harm if the injunction is not granted. As to this latter requirement, some courts
have required a full showing while others have assumed the presence of irreparable harm once
the plaintiff has shown a Title VII violation. Compare, e.g., United States v. Hayes International Corp., 415 F.2d 1038 (5th Cir. 1969); Murry v. American Standard, 488 F.2d 529 (5th
Cir. 1973); Culpepper v. Reynolds Metal Co., 421 F.2d 888 (5th Cir. 1970) with Baxter v.
Sharpe, 10 FEP Cases 1159 (D.N.C. 1975); Hyland v. Kenner Products Co., 10 FEP Cases
367 (S.D. Ohio 1974); Held v. Missouri Pacific R.R. Co., 373 F. Supp. 997 (S.D. Tex. 1974).
For some courts, the time period of the injunction granted has been linked to the showing of
irreparable harm made. See, e.g., Hyland v. Kenner Products Co., 10 FEP Cases 367 (S.D.
Ohio 1974). In that case the plaintiff could not show irreparable harm and for that reason
the court limited the injunction to the 180-day EEOC deferral period. Although the result in
the case was, it is urged, incorrect, the court's reasoning is probably correct: because the
injunction is in aid of the administrative process, irreparable harm to the individual need not
be shown. But this reasoning is no less valid after the 180-day deferral period while the case
is still pending in the EEOC. Therefore, under the analysis used herein, as long as the
injunction is granted pending an EEOC disposition, the injunction should stand as long as
the case is pending in the EEOC.
145. CCH 1976 EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL
1781-91.
146. Id. at 1789.
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CONCLUSION

The EEOC simply does not have the manpower to deal with the
vast number of individual complaints filed with it. Thus, if the goals
of Title VII are to be reached under the statutory scheme promulgated by Congress, private individuals must have prompt and full
access to the federal courts. It is particularly critical in many Title
VII cases that court access be available for preliminary injunction
requests pending the EEOC's disposition of the individual charge.
Without such relief, it is probable that the individual who ultimately prevails in court or before the EEOC will already have been
irreparably harmed by the delay and, therefore, the ultimately favorable decision will be meaningless.
The federal courts do have the power to grant preliminary relief
in such cases based upon the general power given them to grant
relief in aid of the administrative process and to preserve their potential jurisdiction. Title VII itself and the legislative history also
clearly indicate that individual plaintiffs should be armed with the
fullest court access possible.
It is hoped that in this second decade after the enactment of Title
VII, unlike the first, full court access will be made readily available
to all who seek it.

